Subsections

4. Topics

4.1 Formal v. Natural Languages

Grice is clear in the ideology behind this.

There's what he calls Modernism and Neo-Modernism.

This is Russell and the heirs of PM

- this INCLUDES, almost by antonomasia, CARNAP.

Then there's

neo-Traditionalism

and earlier, Traditionalism

By this Grice means Aristotelian logic (made respectable by Lukasiewicz) and Strawson's and indeed Oxonian ordinary-language philosophical logic.

- the idea that '&', 'v', -$>$ - the connectives in the syntax of FL do not correspond to the vernaculars of NL 'and', 'or', 'if'.

vide Carnap on this for a formalist (vs informalist) view.

NOTE: Grice came to prefer the modernism-traditionalism distinction to his earlier formalim-informalism. The important thing here is not so much the labels for these sorts of betes noires, but Grice's own brand: the way he saw or presented himself "in society" - and what he called the longitudinal history of philosophy: "a foot in each camp", he jokes. But in essence, that's the aptest description of his position. For his System G- complete with a pragmatics, allows to maintain that the alleged divergences between NL and FL are a matter of 'implicature' rather than logical form.

4.1.1 USA Good for Logic

Carnap observes that the state of Logic teaching in the USA was much better than in Europe,

-- this is echoed by Grice.

He confesses publicly that part of his professional reason - one wonders: couldn't he just write? - for moving to the States was "closer contact with logicians".

Grice is already in 1969 quoting from Boolos, Parsons, Myro, Mates, etc. This is the beginning of his System G. Putnam would actually represss Grice's formalistic fancies short: "You are too formal" he'd complain. Grice did not fit the brit steroretype of the good humanistic Oxford don of the Austinian ilk. Of course they were wrong. Grice fit NO stereotype.

4.2 Metaphysics

how many angels could dance on the point of a needle."

--

Grice cites the same example. In "Prejudices and Predilections".

To consider:

- Note

- Longitudinal unity/latitudinal unity. Metaphysics is important for Grice as a manifestation of philosophy's latitudinal unity: everything connects and metaphysics is the ground-floor discipline: the theory-theory or first philosophy. But unlike Carnap, Grice was an inveterate historicist4.1. He rejoiced in what he called the longitudinal unity of philosophy which Carnap repudiated. Grice found inspiration in time-honoured philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, (Grice to the) Mill, etc. These he called 'the great'. He was less tolerant with the minors - among which he provocatively lists Witters!

-- etc.

wiki ref. by you mentions Hempel

Grice cites Hempel and Reichenbach re: atomistic metaphysics in his ``actions and events'' [Gri86]. To provide quotes by me.

4.3 Betes Noires

4.3.1 phenomenalism

It is surprising Grice lists Phenomenalism as a bete noire. Carnap's tolerance for phenomenalism was well known. His first hand encounters with Goodman couldn't have been but positive. Grice's brand of phenomenalism was of an earlier vintage. None of the sophistification of Goodman. Grice's ideas of phenomenalism were either the rather rough notes by Ayer and I. Berlin in a rather influential paper in Mind in the 1930s. In the postwar period, Grice would rely on work by G. A. Paul, "Is there a problem about sense data?" and Austin's refutation of Ayer. Etc.

Grice and Carnap on physics. Carnap on Einstein. Grice on Eddington's two tables.

also:

4.3.2 inductivism

Strange Grice does not list this as bete noire. And confirmationism (Carnap's reply to Popper's falsificationism). The most technical Grice gets on this is his scattered refs. to Kneale (Ind. and Prob) in Reply to Richards, and his treatment of Davidsonian's probability operators in various publications vis a vis generalisations to desirability operators:

Grice, Probability, Desirability and Mood Operators, 1973. Grice Aspects of Reason. On Probably, as a sentence modifier. etct

this above vis a vis your ref. to Carnap/Kemeny

Bar-Hillel is cited by Chapman in connection with a possible influence of Carnap on Grice. Bar-Hillel had worked with Carnap and comes out with this idea that the divergence between FL and NL is in the 'implicature'. He uses 'implication' and it's the idea of pragmatics as the wastebasket of philosophers. Grice on metaphysical excrescences. etc.

4.3.3 Diagogism

The diagogic. Further to the gladiatorial and the conversational, it is worth pointing out that the later Grice grew less and less tolerant of 'epagoge' and more and more embracing of diagoge. The distinction is Aristotelian, but Grice's twist reminds one of Carnap's pro-attitude for dialogue as stimulating. Grice's father had been a musician and so was his younger brother Derek. The trios they engaged in in Harborne gave Grice a rich ... (thing) about the value of cooperation: "Getting together to do philosophy should be like getting to play music". The epagoge/diagoge distinction is a basic one for Grice's metaphysical methodology. If evidence is, as the neo-Kantian he was, all too clearly necessary, one would hope however that the BASIS for this or that metaphysical claim (or rejection) should rest on its own virtues rather than on the success or failure of having confronted its antithesis. Grice on Kant. The double influence.The influence of Kant on Grice was a later one. As an Oxonian, Kant was not really taken too seriously. In this respect, Carnap's education was more traditionally philosophical (His PhD which Grice never attained, was published in Kant Studien). Grice first came to the proximities of Kant via Abbott's translation, and thus he was more of a minor Kantian than Carnap was, who could savour Kant in the vernacular! - In 1966, Sir Peter Strawson, Grice's former student, published his "Bounds of Sense" which brought Kant to the Oxonian map. Grice will later be invited to deliver the Kant Lectures at Stanford. But importantly for the present conversation: while it was Kant's 'theoretical' reason that only influenced Carnap, Kant's influence on Grice was just as strong on the theoretical if not MORE in the practical realm. Grice, unlike Carnap, looked for the UNITY of reason and justification in all our attitudes: not just doxastic, but notably boulomaic. THis is a strong contrast with Carnap. His neo-Kantianism was theoretical in nature: aimed at epistemological problems concerning space/time coordinates as Carnap found had to be 'vamped out' to deal with discoveries by Einstein, etc. - But Carnap remained an irrationalist in matters of value and ethics. Grice on the other hand possibly had with Kant the insight of the categorial imperative: the dark starry night sky above us. Grice on Frege. Frege was of course one of the inspiring models for


4.3.4 Carnap

For Grice the Frege influence came much later. There is one single ref. to Frege by Grice in his "Prejudices and Predilections" and this only in connection with the idea of the Fregean 'sense' - he writes, "in something like a Fregean sense". Grice is considering, however, one of his 'metaphysical' routines. His Humean projection is supposed to deliver concepts alla Fregean senses. E.g. the concept of negation, the concept of value, the concept of - you name it.

4.3.5 Secularism

Grice's religious inclinations are harder to pin down than Carnap’s. Chapman in fact sounds rather authoritative when she states that "Grice lost all faith by the age of 19" or something. You can never be so sure. Chapman redeems herself by noting the very many religious references, eschatological and Biblical, in Grice's various writings. While a disbeliever in God, Grice liked to play God. Borrowing on this idea by Carnap of pirots which karulize elatically, Grice founds a full programme in the vein of the ideal-observer. What we would do, as God, to secure the survival of pirots. While not religious in nature, it has a religious tone that is absent in the writings of Carnap in any respect. Scholasticism rears its pretty face. how many angels could dance on the point of a needle. Grice cites the same example. In "Prejudices and Predilections". To consider: Longitudinal unity/latitudinal unity. Metaphysics is important for Grice as a manifestation of philosophy's latitudinal unity: everything connects and metaphysics is the ground-floor discipline: the theory-theory or first philosophy. But unlike Carnap, Grice was an inveterate historicisit. He rejoiced in what he called the longitudinal unity of philosophy which Carnap repudiated. Grice found inspiration in time-honoured philosophies of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, (Grice to the) Mill, etc. These he called 'the great'. He was less tolerant with the minors - among which he provocatively lists Witters!

4.3.6 Phenomenalism

It is surprising Grice lists Phenomenalism as a bete noire. Carnap's tolerance for phenomenalism was well known. His first hand encounters with Goodman couldn't have been but positive. Grice's brand of phenomenalism was of an earlier vintage. None of the sophistification of Goodman. Grice's ideas of phenomenalism were either the rather rough notes by Ayer and I. Berlin in a rather influential paper in Mind in the 1930s. In the postwar period, Grice would rely on work by G. A. Paul, "Is there a problem about sense data?" and Austin's refutation of Ayer. Etc. Inductivism. Grice and Carnap on physics. Carnap on Einstein. Grice on Eddington's two tables. Also: inductivism. Strange Grice does not list this as bete noire. And confirmationism (Carnap's reply to Popper's falsificationism). The most technical Grice gets on this is his scattered refs. to Kneale (Ind. and Prob) in Reply to Richards, and his treatment of Davidsonian's probability operators in various publications vis a vis generalisations to desirability operators: Grice, Probability, Desirability and Mood Operators, 1973. Grice Aspects of Reason. On Probably, as a sentence modifier.

4.3.7 Diagogism

The diagogic. Further to the gladiatorial and the conversational, it is worth pointing out that the later Grice grew less and less tolerant of 'epagoge' and more and more embracing of diagoge. The distinction is Aristotelian, but Grice's twist reminds one of Carnap's pro-attitude for dialogue as stimulating. Grice's father had been a musician and so was his younger brother Derek. The trios they engaged in in Harborne gave Grice a rich ... (thing) about the value of cooperation: "Getting together to do philosophy should be like getting to play music". The epagoge/diagoge distinction is a basic one for Grice's metaphysical methodology. If evidence is, as the neo-Kantian he was, all too clearly necessary, one would hope however that the BASIS for this or that metaphysical claim (or rejection) should rest on its own virtues rather than on the success or failure of having confronted its antithesis.

4.3.8 Phenomenalism

It is surprising Grice lists Phenomenalism as a bete noire. Carnap's tolerance for phenomenalism was well known. His first hand encounters with Goodman couldn't have been but positive. Grice's brand of phenomenalism was of an earlier vintage. None of the sophistification of Goodman. Grice's ideas of phenomenalism were either the rather rough notes by Ayer and I. Berlin in a rather influential paper in Mind in the 1930s. In the postwar period, Grice would rely on work by G. A. Paul, "Is there a problem about sense data?" and Austin's refutation of Ayer. Etc.

4.3.9 Inductivism

Grice and Carnap on physics. Carnap on Einstein. Grice on Eddington's two tables. Also: inductivism. Strange Grice does not list this as bete noire. And confirmationism (Carnap's reply to Popper's falsificationism). The most technical Grice gets on this is his scattered refs. to Kneale (Ind. and Prob) in Reply to Richards, and his treatment of Davidsonian's probability operators in various publications vis a vis generalisations to desirability operators: Grice, Probability, Desirability and Mood Operators, 1973. Grice Aspects of Reason. On Probably, as a sentence modifier.

4.3.10 Empiricism

This is the first bête noire. But Grice fails to mention his twin: Rationalism. There is some mystifying about ‘empeira’, as the Greeks used the word. Peira is ultimately a tribunal. There is nothing to scary about having a doctrine based upon the idea of a tribunal.

4.3.11 Extensionalism

While Grice lists this, he fails again to mention the twin: Intensionalism. Grice was not necessarily attracted to Intensionalism. So his rejection of Extensionalism is indeed a case of his epagoge, trying to refute a thesis rather than provide positive evidence for its contrary. The root ‘tensio’, that is common to both bêtes noires is an interesting one, and related to the deeper questions about meaning.

Since we are currently examining this vis a vis Carnap, we speak of 'Grice morphed onto an intensional isomorphist'. The early Grice was not. He would say that the utterer who utters,

p -> q

is the same utterer who utters

-p v q

These are intensionally nonisomorphic (perhaps - but this label is best applied to predicate calculus). What U means, however, is the same. As a defender of truth-functionalism, the early Grice is an extensional isomorphist.

The later Grice finds this a protectionist measure for the commodity of an explanation that does use 'intensional isomorphism':

Grice then says he'll select "Extensionalism", which he defines as

"a position imbued with the spirit of Nominalism [another bete noire] and dear both to those who feel that (b) is no more informative an answer to the question (a) than would be (d) as an answer to (c)."

Scenario I:

a: Why is a pillar box called 'red'? b: Because it is red.

Scenario II:

c: And why is that person called 'Paul Grice'?

d: Because he is Paul Grice.

Cfr. Geary's daughter:

Geary: Why are pigs dirty? Daughter: Because they are pigs.

--

The picture of Extensionalism Grice presents is clear enough. It is

"a world of PARTICULARS as a domain stocked with tiny pellets ... distinguish[ed] by the clubs to which they belong".

He had a thing for clubs. He would define Austin's club as "the club for those whose members have no class" (or rather 'for those whose classes have no members')

And cfr. The Grice Club, extensionally and intensionally defined. Cfr. Jones, "Carnap Corner", next blog.

Grice goes on:

"The potential consequences of the possession of in fact UNEXEMPLIFIED features [or properties] would be ... the same."

Grice then turns to a pet topic of his, "Vacuity". He had dedicated his contribution to the anti-dogmatist of them all, Quine, with an essay on "Vacuous Names and Descriptions" published 1969 in Hintikka/Davidson (we need a reprint of that, urgently!). And he knew what he was talking about. We have discussed this with Roger Bishop Jones elsewhere ('Vacuity' in Hist-Anal)

Vis a vis his critique of Extensionalism (and where is Grice's diagogism when one wants it?) one may want to

"relieve a certain VACUOUS predicate ... by exploiting the NON-VACUOUSNESS of other predicates which are constituents in the definition of the original vacuous predicate."

This is good, because his "Vacuous Names" focuses on, well, names, rather than predicates or descriptors. Here his approach is more, shall we say, substantial: connotative, rather than denotative.

Grice exemplifies this with two allegedly vacuous (i.e. non-extensional) predicates:

1

- " ... is married to a daughter of an English queen and a pope"

2

- " ... is a climber on hands and knees of a 29,000 foot mountain."

The second has echoes in "Vacuous Names"

That's Marmaduke Bloggs.

Marmaduke Bloggs is indeed a climber on hands and knees of a 29,000 ft. mountain. The Merseyside Geographicall Society was so impressed that they had this cocktail in his honour. But he failed to turn up.

"He is not at the party"

"Who isn't?"

"Marmaduke Bloggs"

"He doesn't exist. He was invented by the journalists".

-- etc. Cfr. Horn on a similar passage by Lewis Carroll on this - in his Symbolic Logic.

--

Grice is interested in what makes Marmaduke Bloggs an 'elusive chap, if ever there was one':

"By appealing to different

"relations" [now, alla Carnap, Abriss]

to the 'primitive' predicates, one can claim is

such distinct relation,

rather than the empty set beloved of extensionalists which each vacuous predicate is made equivalent to."

But his objection to this move has to do with what he feels an adhocness in defining the relations as involving again, NON-VACUOUS predicates.

- the relevant passage is available as google books -. (p. 70).

A SECOND TACK. (He is looking for harder and harder tacks)

A second way out to the alleged problem involves 'trivial' versus 'non-trivial' explanations.

Recall that for Grice all betes noires trade on the untradeability of explanations. They want to restrict the realm of explananda. They regiment our hopes for explanation. (Hume's fork or his is-ought problem would be similar blockages).

Grice has it in clear enough terms:

"the explanatory opportunities for vacuous predicates depend on their embodiment in a system".

His caveat here is purely ontological, or shall we say eschatological:

"I conjecture, but cannot demonstrate,

that the only way to secure such a

system would be to confer

SPECIAL ONTOLOGICAL privilege

upon the ENTITIES of PHYSICAL SCIENCE..."

- But that's Eddington "non-visible" 'table'. And he had a foot on both camps here, or rather, he knew that, historically, he was and will forever be seen as a proponent of Austinian Code: the idea that there is wisdom in folk: the cathedral of laerning is Science but it's also Common Sense, as expressed in our ordinary ways of talking (ta legomena).

And he seems to be allowing that sometimes we do engage in talk where the entities of things OTHER than physical science are relevant too. Notably stone-age physics. This is possibly a thing of the past now, but most of the English ways of talking (if grammar is going to be 'a pretty good guide to logical form') are embued with it, and they would be just rejected en bloc if only CONTEMPORARY physical science, true physical science, is deemed articulatory only.

Grice notes at this point:

"It looks AS IF states of affairs in the ... scientific world need, for credibility, support from the vulgar world of ORDINARY OBSERVATION..." -

Eddington's visible 'table' to which he explicitly refers in his little quoted, "Actions and Events" (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1986).

And this, he feels would be an 'embellisment' in need of some justification. In other words, if the real table (of Eddington) is not made of matter, but of wavicles, why is it that a wavicle be deemed as a more fundamental entity than, say, 'table as we knew it'?

4.3.12 Functionalism

Again it’s difficult to see what twin bête Grice is having in mind. Not Formalism, but indeed, the standard antonymy is form versus function. As per Aristotle. Thus, think of ‘cabbage’. What is the function of a cabbage? To cabbagise, Grice suggests (2001 – of cabbages and kings). Oddly, while Grice sees functionalism as a bête noire, the Original Christian found “Formalist”. We read from Bunyan: “And as [Christian] was troubled thereabout, he espied two men come tumbling over the wall, on the left hand of the narrow way; and they made up apace to him. The name of the one was Formalist”. But what Bunyan is having in mind of course is mere Dogmatism. Something to consider here is that Grice may have thought that Functionalism is Not Enough. Thus, when B.F. Loar, for example defines simple things like Grice’s conversational maxims as “empirical generalisations over functional states” (Mind and Meaning, Cambridge University Press) we know that that will leave Grice cold. He is going to look for a deeper explanation than that.

4.3.13 Materialism

When it comes to this ism, again it’s interesting not just to consider the twin, but the root. After all, Grice was an Aristotelian, and matter is all there is for Aristotle: the hule. So ‘Hylism’ would be a better term. At least less hybrid. By rejecting Hylism, Grice may be again saying that it is insufficient rather than wrong. After all for Aristotle, who played with ‘hule’, we need the basic compound: matter and form: hyle and morph. But doesn’t “hylomorphism” sounds as a scarier bete than Hylism?

4.3.14 Mechanism

Indeed one bete noire destroyed by another. Antonym here: Telism. I.e. the idea that final causes are all we need. The root of mechanism in the Greek idea of mekhane is not as bad after all. Naturalism. Twin bete noire: non-naturalism, as per Moore’s non-naturalistic fallacy which Grice rejects in “Conception of Value”: ‘value’ cannot be non-natural, as Moore would think about this. Grice’s sympathies were for constructed entities – and constructivist approaches to value in particular along the lines made familiar in Oxford by J. L. Mackie and Philippa Foot (both authors he mainly focuses on in (1991)). Nominalism. Is he thinking of Realims as the twin bete noire? One thinks so. But Grice came only at a very late stage to become a realist, and with caveats. He never was the closet realist that Davidson was (Speranza here recalls his conversations with Davidson on this on occasion of Speranza delivering his very first Gricean paper – in, of all places, Buenos Aires!)(vide Speranza 1989). Grice was no realist in that he thought that realism needed some transcendental justification: our beliefs have to be true because they would be useless if they weren’t. Similarly he never abandoned the idea that only via sense-data do material objects enter our cognitive schemes: objects threaten and nourish us: sense data don’t. If the opposition is with realia over universalia, I would think Grice was enough of an occamist (would you modify Occam’s razor if you were not?) to throw the baby with the water. Phenomenalism. The funny bit about this that here we do have a case where both a bete noire and her twin (Physicalism) both scare the Christian in Grice! Strictly, the perfect antonym, at least for Kant, for this would be Noumenalism, as per “Philosophy 4”. A caveat however is in order: noumenon does not really oppose phainomenon, at least for the Grecians. Noumenon is the realm of thought. So it’s Mentalism which the proper bete noire would be. Incidentally, Mentalism can claim however, the status of the twin for the bete noire of Physicalism, too. Positivism. However, it may do here to consider betes noires that one usually associates with Positivism, too. Inductivism, Confirmationism, etc. What about Popper’s falsificationism? Is this a twin bete noire here? It seems so. Strictly, the anonym for falsificationism would be confirmationalism.

4.3.15 Physicalism

The source for this all “Prejudices and predilections”, now safely deposited at BANC 90/35c, was triggered by a request by Grandy and Warner, so Grice may have been in a hurry. For indeed, a hasty etymological ramble leads you to conclude that Naturalism and Physicalism are two ugly rearing heads of the SAME bete. “phusis” of the Grecians was the Nature of the Romans. Reductionism. His twin, irreductionism, is just as scary. It would seem that indeed, analysis is what bridges C and G. So that an irreducible feature is a non-sequitur. Perhaps the clearest Grice gets on this is his reply to Davidson on intending. Davidson, who was perhaps Grice’s soul mate more than anyone else while at Berkeley, Grice found reductionist. And this in the sense, that Davidson went for the bigger picture, failing to see the leaves for the tree. His account of volition, for example, Grice finds obscenely reductionist. Grice has manifestos to the effect: (words). “Not that Davidson’s picture is wrong; it’s just too simple: surely when I inspect my mind and see all the volitional things that I associate it with, there’s no big core picture in terms of the desirability operator that Davidson is claiming is basic”. So the anti-reductionist Grice is wanting to say that the richness of the phenomenon (or better, phenomena) in question has to be given proper due before going for the easy way out of a reductive (even) explanation. Scepticism. Twin bete noire? Dogmatism, just as bad. Alla Grandy (cited by Grice, [Gri89]:xix) we can say that it’s Underdog-matism, with Grice, but yet. The idea behind ‘scepsis’ was not that bad: it was a thorough (but not perhaps that thorough, for Grice) examination. His caveats for anti-sceptical views however were clear in those essays Grice cared to reprint in [Gri89] that bear titles like, “Common sense and scepticism”. As a autobiographical reminder, Speranza should here disclose that indeed he felt very close to Grice when he realised that the topic of scepticism had fascinated Grice, as it had fascinated Speranza, from a tender age. “Common sense and scepticism” Grice dates as 1946. I.e. the third or fourth piece he produced. His first being “Negation” 1938. Grice’s arguments therein are directed towards Norman Malcom’s assuming the Moorean position of the Ordinary Languager versus Phyrro.

I enjoyed your three points re: Carnap's thing. Will see what I can say about it from G's perspective. (Oddly Grice uses initials a lot: he has M, A, R, U, G., in his Retrospective Epilogue. So surely he would not object to C. He distinguishes between G and G* but I forget what the distinction amounts to.

4.4 Pirot Talk

More on the pirot talk. Vis a vis Carnap’s focus on relations in his 1929 Abriss der Logistik, Grice expands on the pirots that karulise elatically. These can potch and cotch and fed – where Fed is a variable for a relation ship. in Carnap's sense. Grice made this public in the Lectures on Language and Reality in a memorable summer symposium in Irvine in 1971. etc. Can pirots implicate?

Bar-Hillel is cited by Chapman in connection with a possible influence of Carnap on Grice. Bar-Hillel had worked with Carnap and comes out with this idea that the divergence between FL and NL is in the 'implicature'. He uses 'implication' and it's the idea of pragmatics as the wastebasket of philosophers. Grice on metaphysical excrescences. etc.

4.5 Carnucopia

Conceptual Map to

CARNUCOPIA and GRICELAND

(also one page only)

. . Aristotle

Hume is Where the Heart Is

Kant

(Kantotle, Ariskant)

.

Cornucopia

neo-Kantianism

Oxford Hegelianism

Ryle sends Ayer to Vienna

Wiener Kries

Ayer returns from Vienna Splits from Austin's playgroup

The War

Grice influential in Austin's 'kindergarten'

Grice travels to the USA to deliver the William James and puns on Heidegger alla Carnap. "Heidegger is the greatest living philosopher, if you can take me seriously" ([Gri89]:i)

Carnap Grice introduces his pirotological programme in the APA presidential address (Pacific Division) for 1975.

Carnap dies

Grice gives the Carus Lectures (published as Grice 1991)

Grice's Aspects of Reason lectures published 2001.

---

Then one page about

The Place of Metaphysics in

CARNUCOPIA GRICELAND

ontologia

generalis specialis

Theory of Categories

(a) cosmologia vs.

(b) psychologia rationalis Eschatology

---

Then

one page for

Lingua Franca

(Carnap and Grice find they can hold a conversation in a lingua franca)

System G-HP

here I will provide the 13 items, I think they are which Grice thinks are constitutive of a good formal language ([Gri89]:ii - first two pages)

We are going to use a simplified semantics for

"Pirots karulize elatically"

-- pirot P x is a pirot iff karulize K K as a class. = names of pirots the logical form of adverbs, the elatically of Carnap. quantifiers: all pirots karulize elatically understood. scalar implicature of "Some" (Some pirots karulise elatically; some not) etc. essential properties. pirots MUST karulise elatically

FL NL

syntactics

definition of 'proof'

Grentzen-type rules

----------------------

Semantics

Carnacopian Griceland Pragmatics Pragmatics

the realm of pragmatism - the realm of implicature

---

The Actual Conversation.

For this Jones and Speranza met online and recorded their online dialogue. The result is as follows

CARNAP/JONES. Hello.

GRICE/SPERANZA. Hello

. . .

GRICE-Speranza. Whatever

CARNAP-Jones. Whatever

- they part.

--

--

--

For the NOTES

-- Waismann. Grice, as a Brit, would be more familiar with the views of Waismann, the member of the Vienna Circle who had made it to England.

-- Grice lectured on metaphysics for the BBC. The result is in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics, 1957. This is vintage Grice. I.e. Grice self-presenting as a metaphysician as 'ambitious' as Kantotle was. Metaphysics was starting to cease being the term of abuse he felt Ayer had turned onto.

-- Grice, unlike Carnap, was professionally involved in DEFENDING metaphysics. He delivered annually two courses on Metaphysics. Usually with G. Myro. Naturally, he felt the professional defence of the discipline was what was professionally and institutionally required from him, especially after becoming Full prof. at Berkeley in 1975.

-- Grice's student, Sir Peter Strawson had become by 1968 the standard for metaphysical theory as understood in England and Oxford. As Waynflete professor he became more and more interested in neo-Kantian foundations for the discipline.

-- Myro was a special influence in Grice's metaphysical thought. Originated educated at Oxford in Balliol, he had a strict logical background and inspired Grice in much of what transpired as Grice's System Q, which Myro later re-baptised System G - "in gratitude to Paul Grice for the original idea"

-- The syntax of System G makes use of scope devices to allow for pragmatic implicature. These undertake two forms: (i) the use of square brackets to indicate common-ground status. Grice provides formal rules for the introduction and elimination of square brackets in [Gri89]:xviii) (ii) the use of numerical subscripts (in Vacuous Names). This allows for the scope maximal readings of formulae but allowing as well for a minimal reading upon a simple numerical transformation.

--

Grice and Strawson had defended the analytic-syntetic distinction in "In defense of a dogma" but Grice grew sceptical as to the success of that defense (of an underdogma, as he later had it). He grew more and more pragmatist towards the viability of the need to postulate the distinction.

--

Carnap's "meaning postulates" have affinities with Grice's notion of 'entailment' which he drew from Moore. Moore, while not a formal logician, is responsible for this coinage, which appealed Grice, as he would contrast, in his System G, only entailment with 'implicature'. There would be no place for 'presupposition' or truth-value gaps in this scheme, as there is in Strawson. The metaphysical implications of Grice's choice of a bivalent standard interpretation of System G are obvious.

Grice spoke excellent English. As Clifton and Corpus Christi educated, he found easily crowds of followers, especially in America, in younger philosophers who had grown tired of their dogmatic empiricist teachers. Grice brought a breath of fresh air. This is ironical as seen from the other side of the 'pond', in that the breath of fresh air can be looked, in a sort of inverted snobbery, as an irreverent reactionary dogmatism! On the other hand, Carnap was perhaps less influential among the younger philosophers.

It's pretty easy to trace genealogical trees from Grice to the major figures in the Anglo-American analytic philosophy of a decade ago or so. It is perhaps less easy to do same with Carnap.

Important metaphysicians with Gricean influences include G. Bealer, G. Myro in the USA. Strawson and Peacocke in the US.

-- The growth, continuing, of Gricean bibliography is overwhelming. Books published in his memory, although not necessarily from cutting-edge philosophers. He was after all, a philosopher's philosopher. The secondary bibliography on Carnap is perhaps not so vast.

4.6 Dialogue

I.e. your gladiatorial thing as thesis. With a reference to Aristotle 'epagoge' which I think will look cute in Greek letters.

Then the second paragraph is your conversation thing - with Aristotle's "diagoge" in Greek letters. which will look cute.

The synthesis is: sort of what you say about this being an "imaginary" conversation along these lines. To sound good literary, we can drop the Landor reference in the references:

Landor, Imaginary Conversations.

The epagoge/diagoge distinction used by Grice bears on this. It may be best provided some formalisation. Let 'c1' be claim c as put forward by philosopher C (Carnap). Let c2 be claim as put forward by philosopher G (Grice)

C G

c1 c2

In the epagoge model, c2 only attains sense vis a vis c1. G's claim to fame is seen as C's claim to infame, and vice versa. The epagoge works indeed gladiatorially: the success of c2 is in the defeat of c1 and vice versa. It is a zero-sum game, where game is loosely understood as such. More like a mediaeval joust, if you ask us.

In the diagoge model, we need to add pieces of evidence, e1 and e2. So we get

C G

e1 --> c1 c2 <-- e2

The success of each claim does depend on the strength and virtue of their own corresponding backings. But we feel we need a synthesis to the epagoge-diagoge dialectic then. For there are issues regarding the incommensurability of the respective pieces of evidence and the topicalisation issue (are c1 and c2 about the same thing - or is Grice changing the subject). Last but not least, there is the question as to to what extent this is just "imaginary". After all, we are building a bridge: looking for some sort of 'actual' conversation, and it seems that we still have C with his c1 and e1 on one hand and G with his c2 and e2 on the other. So what gives? We propose then a sort of criss-crossing. Where we add e1' : i.e. evidence derived from c1 as it supports or fails to support c2. And we add e2', i.e. evidence as derived from c2 which supports or fails to support c1. Only when we reach this level of bridging can we say that G is conversing with C and vice versa:

C G

e1 e2 . . . . . . c1 c2 . . . . e1' e2'

Bunyan, John. (1678). The pilgrim's progress from this world, to that which is to come, delivered under the similitude of a dream, wherein is discovered, the manner of his setting out, his dangerous journey; and safe arrival at the desired countrey. London: Nash.

[As early as] 1946, Bar-Hillel [was discussing] the sense of 'imply' identified by Moore, proposing to describe it as 'pragmatical' (p. 334). He identifies himself as a supporter of 'logical empiricism' (he quotes approvingly a comment from Carnap to the effect that natural languages are TOO COMPLEX and MESSY to be the focus of rigorous scientific enquiry) and his article ['Analysis of "correct" language'. Mind 55 328-30) is aimed explicitly at REJECTING philosophy of the 'analytic method' ... However, he suggests that by using sentences that are 'MEANINGLESS' to logical empiricists, such as the sentences of METAPHYSICS or [worse, JLS] aesthetics [never mind 'ethics'. JLS], 'one may nevertheless imply [empahsis Bar-Hillel. JLS] sentences which are PERFECTLY MEANINGFUL, according to the same criteria, and are perhaps even true and highly important' (p.338). - cited by Chapman in her book on Grice.

4.7 technical

While Carnap has these as applying to 'rejection', in a more charitable light we can see the labels as applying to approaches. It seems plausible to entertain the idea that it takes a metaphysical stand to reject another. So what's the technical side to this. G would surely oppose a characterisation of metaphysics as the realm of 'synthetic' truths. If anything of value, metaphysics has to transcend that realm. In the way that Nietzsche said (we think) that morality was beyond evil and good. The analytic-synthetic distinction must be one of the first offshots of our metaphysical thinking, so it cannot be presupposed by it! Now C's way out here, the distinction between 'necessary' and 'analytic' would be one that may perhaps appeal G. We mean, he was one for splitting anyday (never lump). Assuming a retreat to 'analytic' would be viscious here (or vascuous, if you want), we are left with 'necessary'. Now, this operator Grice found increasingly complex. C's idea that it deals with the denotatum rather than the denotans is one which would have appealed G. Echoes of ratio essendi come to mind. Grice was hoping (recall Hopeful is Christian's soul mate in his pilgrimage to the Celestial City) that philosophy (or metaphysics, specifically) could provide a backing for ratio as apply to esse not just cognoscere. While C's would have had the knee jerk reaction, "Scholastic!" this need not be so. The idea is that while 'must' (the token of 'necessity' as it were) applies to various realms but it's not for that reason 'aequivocal'. It is rather aequi-vocal: i.e. the same vox for various items. There is ontological necessity, there is cognitive necessity, there is logical necessity ('analyticity' in C's jargon). So what gives. Grice would go on to define metaphysics as that part of the discipline of the philosopher, perhaps qua eschatologist, which defines the axioms for our understanding of 'must'. When and how are we ready to postulate an item as deontic. Deontic is the adjective that would have appealed Grice at this point. It's the deon of the

4.7.1 Greeks

The idea that some things are, some others must be. The internal-external distinction C draws at this point would have sounded to G "a mere Hartism". Hart had distinguished between internal and external readings of things (notably ascriptions of right: "Carnap is right" "Carnap is wrong". On an internal reading, we assume he is wrong. On an external reading we assume that someone assumes he is wrong. Grice discusses this feature of 'deontic' in connection with Nixon being appointed the Professor of Moral philosophy at Oxford! (Grice 2001). The levels of internal, external, and middle-of-the-way readings are formidably complex as Grice was wont to say. But in any case, the offshot is that the 'deontic' operator need not be self-referential: i.e. it's not like our grasp of the meaning of 'deontic' involves our acceptance of 'deontic' as deontic at a higher level. Ultimately Grice would have appealed to a mere reiteration of symbols. Some operators are not deontic. Notably the boulomaic operators, the volitional operators. What we decide or deem that we'll do. This is mere volitional. But volitional predicates have the ability to go recursive. We decide to decide. And we decide to decide to decide. When this iteration is given free reign, we find that we have cashed the deontic operator out of the boulomaic operator. This type of transcategorial epithets would thus define the 'necessity' which we associate with this or that metaphysical scheme. In G's case, his hidden agenda is not so hidden: he wants to license the metaphysics (or physics as he would sometime say) underlying English! (The sun rises from the East - will we still be using 'rise' knowing that that is NOT what it does? Isn't this getting involved in stone-age physics? Whatever. But that is not a serious issue. More serious is the inability of ordinary English speakers to go beyond the solid 'table'. The solid 'table' is what we mean by table. If it turns out that Eddington is right (as he most likely is) and the real table is a bunch of wavicles, we may still want to keep using the metaphysical scheme that we inherited from our ancestors - cavemen no doubt - out of respect for them, and because if we are not that dumb we know how to translate one metaphysical scheme onto another!

4.7.2 intuitive approach

There is something to be said for Carnap's gut rejection for metaphysics. His claim to fame is actually his laughing at Heidegger's Nothing Noths. So we could consider this in more detail. German: Nicht nichtet. This was thought serious enough by Ryle when he cared to review Heidegger for Mind. But what does ``Nicht nichtet'' amount to? At this point, Bar-Hillel's throwing onto the same wastebasket `metaphysics' and `ethics' or aesthetics, won't do. Carnap is a much more serious philosopher than early Ayer's caricature of the statements of ethics as ``ouch'' and ``pooh!''. But there is more to consider here. In this work we cannot hope to cover all realms of statements, so we better focus on allegedly metaphysical statement or pseudostatements (schein- is the lovely suffix for Carnap here) of metaphysics. So what's wrong with ``Nothing noths''. Carnap thinks this breaks a rule of grammar. And it does! Heidegger MEANT it as a breach of a rule of grammar. Heidegger kept saying these things, to the point that, no C, but G, could laugh at him when he said, ``Heidegger is the greatest living philosopher'' (in [Gri89]:i). So what was Heidegger up to. We believe he was PLAYING with the rules of grammar. He is into ``not''. "Not" is a trick of a word. He had an intuitive, or gutty feel for language as play. So out of ``not'' he coins the noun, ``nought'', ``Nicht''. (Nought is a complex word in English, involving ne- and aught. I.e. Not Something - No-Thing. Noths. But what about the verb, `noths'. Well, it does seem like a thing Nothingness would do. To do nothing. To who? G was fascinated by the grammar of verbal constructions. He played with things like `tigers tigerise' (1991:x). So he wouldn't have objected, upon proper understanding of what rules we are 'flouting' here - with a sprinkling of Strawson's ``Subject and predicate in logic and grammar'' for good measure - to utter, ``Nichts nichtet''. It's like, if you can't beat them, join them.

4.7.3 radical approach

G would have enjoyed that. Indeed Bradley for G, and Heidegger for C are what we may call arch- or ur-metaphysicians. Recall G's WoW: ``nobody since the demise of the influence of Bradley was even remotely inclined to believe that'', where we don't even need to care what the claim Was. Some absurd extravaganza. This is amusing, because we do know that both C and G did care for their ancestors. C for Kant's and Neo-Kant's extravaganzas, G for Bradley (eg. on 'negation' or 'deixis'). So it was more of a pose, that, we can say, get the headlines. The various readings of C's specifics in his "Ontological" essay would have amused G. Indeed Quine could get over the top about what 'there is' - a seminal work that both C and Q were very aware of. But C's radicalism was perhaps more `intuitive' - if we can lump these two labels here - than G's. G would have examined what we mean by `real' or `really' when C's claim, on the serious reading of his ``Ontology'' paper, that this or that `does not really exist'. As opposed to th'other `does really exist'. After all, why, G would have it, should we give such a hoot to a mere `trouser-word' such as `real' is? Surely our radical opposition to a campaign as serious as metaphysics is presented to be (by metaphysicians, no doubt) should rest on something more substantial than that. The topic of the evidence gets us closer to the nail we need to hit. This is back to some of Grice's betes noires (Phenomenalism, indeed) - but again, a close examination at how language works does suggest a neat way out. For we claim the denotata of our terms to go beyond the evidence we may have (or lack) to `assert' the `warrantibility' of our claims. ``The cat is on the mat''. No intension here makes a strict reference as to how we get to KNOW that. It's here where an examination of the `simpler ways' in which `pirots karulise elatically' will, we hope, eventually land us on the Celestial City. And then, wouldn't we find it boring enough that we are going to scream alla Heidegger! (``Out! Get me Out of Here!'').

This quote from WoW:then

"(Mrs. Jack)," Grice says,

"also reproves me for "reductionism," in terms which suggest that whatever account or ANALYSIS of meaning is to be offered, it should not be one which is 'reductionist,' which might or might not be equivalent to a demand that a PROPER analysis should not be a PROPER REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS. But what KIND of analysis is to be provided? What I think we cannot agree to allow her to do is to pursue the goal of giving a LAX REDUCTIVE ANALYSIS of meaning , that is, a reductive analysis which is UNHAMPERED by the contraints which characteristically attach to reductive analysis, like the avoidance of circularity; a goal, to which, to my mind several of my opponents have in fact addressed themsleves ((In this connection, I should perhaps observe that though MY EARLY ENDEAVOURS in the theory of meaning were attempts to provide a REDUCTIVE analysis, I HAVE NEVER (I THINK) espoused reductionism, which to my mind involves the idea that semantic concepts are unsatisfactory or even UNINTELLIGIBLE, unless they can be provided with interpretations in terms of some predetermined, privileged, and favoured array of concepts; in this sense of "reductionism" a felt ad hoc need for reductive analysis does NOT have to rest on a REDUCTIONIST foundation. Reductive analysis might be called for to get away from unclarity not to get to some predesignated clarifiers)). I shall for the moment assume that the demand that I face is for a form of REDUCTIVE analysis which is less grievously flawed than the one which I in fact offered; and I shall reserve until later considerations of the idea that what is needed is NOT any kind of reductive analysis but rather some other mode of explication of the concept of meaning" (WoW:351).

4.7.4 Clarification

In this respect, it is clarificatory that, for Grice, as for Carnap, psychological concepts should be introduced as theoretical terms, rather than as ones based on observation. The locus classicus here is Grice's use of Ramsification to introduce T terms in terms of O terms (in Grice 1991).

We like the idea that indeed Grice is perhaps slightly hasty in dealing with all the betes noires at one fell swoop as it were, or at the one blading of the sword.

The fact that all of the betes noires end in -ism is perhaps telling. This is a Greek suffix, -ismos which of course Grice would NOT reject in other collocations: his beloved Aristotelian 'syllogismos' for example. So we have to be careful.

Grice seems to consider that besides this common mark - they all end in -ism, they may also all be seen as the offsprings of "Minimalism" - his rejection of desserted, or made-dessert landscapes (the rosebushes and cherry-trees in the springtime). We shall have to get back there.

4.8 Beyond the Pirot talk

CHAPTER FOUR: BEYOND THE PIROT TALK. As we have seen (3.2.2.1 – i.e. our reactions to extensionalism) there are broader issues here. To what extent will an intensionalist NOT feel betrayed by an intensionalist. Some of the most formidable passages in WoW:RE deal with this. He is here concerned with what we may see as an ‘intensional’ , i.e. non-truth-functional context. But we’ll need to elaborate on that. On p. 374 of WoW:RE he writes:

“A truth-functional conception of COMPLEX propositions offers prospects, perhaps, for the rational construction of at least part of the realm of propositions, even though the fact that many complex propositions SEEM PLAINLY to be NON-truth-funtctional ensures that many problems remain” -- the naivete of Grice is formidable here. For he is saying that something is plainy or SEEMS plainly thus and thus. By what evidence. It seems that whatever evidence he has to SAY that is of a different kind from the evidence he is supporting as providing a ‘rational construction’. Etc. I would think that whatever Carnap had as an intensional context would fit the bill here in not being truth-functional. One is less sure that G would have been happy with a mere extensional treatment of modal propositions. Etc.

4.8.1 Un-Carnapian Grice

"The un-Carnapian character of my constructivism would perhaps be evidenced by my idea that to insist with respect to each [pirotic] stage in metaphysical develoment upon the need for THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION might carry with it the thought that to omit such a stage would be to fail to do justice to some legitimate metaphysical demand" (Gr91:76)

> ``The un-Carnapian character of my constructivism''

he is thinking that Carnap was such a pragmatist that he was into 'theoretical justifications' being practical?

would perhaps be:

evidenced by my idea that to insist with respect to each [pirotic] stage in metaphysical development

this in the context of what you were asking before about the objectivity of value judgements. Grice is introducing 'pirots' or creatures the last stage of which will endow them with a capacity to project values onto the world (and thus turn them objective via construction).

`` upon the need for THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION might carry with it the thought that to omit such a stage would be to fail to do justice to some legitimate metaphysical demand"

-- yes here it is where he gets complex. For he uses too many neg. constructions, omit, fail to do... etc. omit and fail are so negative that one wonders... he is saying that not to omit is not to fail to include is to succeed So he is saying that by including value-thus construed he IS fulfilling a demand.

-- I think the carnapian would say that if there is no theoretical justification one would not be succeeding.

Anyway, we will provide such a detailed exegesis that the reader will omit to fail to understand it, for she will!

Roger Bishop Jones 2016-01-07